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ANNEXATION - VIRGINIA'S DILEMMA
WILLIAM L. MARTIN*

and J. E. BUCHHOLTZJ-

I. HISTORICAL DATA
A. Governmental Concepts
A discussion of annexation in the Commonwealth of Virginia can
become meaningful to the practitioner only when viewed in light of
several basic governmental concepts of the Commonwealth. It is first
necessary to accept and understand the underlying cardinal principle
that Virginia is almost totally unique in her governmental structure
both in theory and in practice.1 One need do no more than perfunctorily examine the governmental structure of the political subdivisions
of Virginia to become aware of the State's uniqueness. Virginia has
developed the doctrine of separation of governmental units to a level
equalled by only a small number of cities2 without the territorial confines of Virginia and the State of Oregon.3
The precise nature of the Virginia governmental structure may
best be characterized by the definitive expressions "counties" and
"cities". This is to say, counties and cities in the Commonwealth are
major political subdivisions of the state totally separate and distinct
from each other. 4 The essential function of county government is
to provide governmental needs to rural areas. 5 On the other hand, the
essential function of city government is to provide governmental needs
to urban areas. 6 In order to allay any misapprehensions, we point out
*Partner, Martin, Hopkins and Lemon, Roanoke, Virginia. Co-Counsel to City
of Roanoke on annexation matters. LL.B. 1936, Washington and Lee University.
-Associate, Martin, Hopkins and Lemon, Roanoke, Virginia. Advisory associate
counsel to City of Roanoke on annexation matters. B.S. 1957, Mississippi Southern
College; LL.B. 196o, Washington and Lee University.
"Virginia adheres to the English theory of "home rule" or "independent" cities,
and has applied this theory to all cities in the Commonwealth. VA. CoDE ANN. § 15.1ioO (Repl. Vol. 1964), Supervisors v. Saltville Land Co., 99 Va. 640, 39 S.E. 704 ('go').
See also, Colonial Heights v. Chesterfield County, 196 Va. 155, 82 S.E.2d 566 (1954).
2See, Charter of St. Louis, Missouri, and of Baltimore, Maryland.
3See, ORE. CoNsT. art. 4 § I (a) and art. ii § 2; ORE. REv. STAT. § 221410 (Supp.
1965).
'Supervisors v. Saltville Land Co., 99 Va. 640, 39 S.E. 704 (igoi). See also, VA.
CONsT. arts. 7, 8.
"State policy is defined in relation to counties and cities in Norfolk County v.
Portsmouth, 186 Va. 1032, 45 S.E.2d 136 (1947).
6lbid.
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at this juncture that "towns", the other significant governmental unit
functioning in Virginia, operate as a part of the counties in which they
are situated.7 Moreover, a town is constitutionally defined as an incorporated community having a population of less than 5,000 inhabitants within defined boundaries and not having a city charter
at the time of adoption of the Constitution of 19o2.8
The origin of the "separate and distinct" philosophy of governmental units within the state governmental structure is decidedly obscure. 9 However, in 19o,10 the Supreme Court of Appeals accepted
not only a distinction between cities and towns but also a clear and
unequivocable separation of cities and counties.'" Because of the unquestioned and universal adherence within the Commonwealth to the
doctrine of the Saltville decision, 12 we are confronted with one of
the single most important judicial declarations ever announced by the
Supreme Court of Appeals. Within the year of the Saltville case, delegates of Virginia met in Constitutional Convention and their actions
resulted in the eventual adoption of the Constitution of 1902. Pursuant
to this document, with some amendments through the years, the lives
of the citizens of Virginia are to this day governed.
The Constitution of 19o2 is singularly significant to this discussion. In the first instance it provides an absolute separation of cities
and counties by providing for a distinctive governmental organization
.for these two political subdivisions in separate articles.' 3 Secondly, in
line with the Saltville doctrine it draws a clear distinction between
cities and towns.' 4 And finally, it provides that future extensions (annexations) and contractions of corporate boundaries shall be accomplished by general legislation. 15 Of additional importance is the fact
that the Constitution of 1902 falls short of assigning towns a clear position in the governmental scheme of things. We are, therefore, con"Supervisors v. Saltville Land Co., 99 Va. 640, 39 S.E. 704 (191o).
8VA. CONST. art. 8, § 116.
'The origin of the theory is attributed by various authorities to Va. Const.
(1851) or to VA. CoNsT. art. 6 (1868) but no clear distinction is made. See e.g., Wade
v. City of Richmond, 59 Va. (18 Gratt.) 583 (1868).
"Supervisors v. Saltville Land Co., 99 Va. 640, 39 S.E. 704 (1901).
1Id. at 644-45, "A city is entitled, under the provisions of Article VI of the Constitution, to a separate government, and, when incorporated is no part of the county
for governmental purposes. But this is not true of a town. Its people and property
are still subject to the county government for county purposes."
12Supervisors v. Saltville Land Co., 99 Va. 64o, 39 S.E. 704 (9o).
"'VA. CONsT. art. 7, 8.
"VA. CONST. art. 8, § 116.
'VA. CONST. art. 8, § 126.
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strained to conclude that such position in fact emanates from the authority of the Saltville case. 16
The impact of the Virginia governmental structure on annexation
proceedings may best be understood in relation to certain recurring
case situations. In most cases the courts17 are faced with a highly adversarial proceeding between two or more political subdivisions of
the State which have no direct allegiance one with the other. Moreover, volumes of highly technical expert evidence are quite frequently
introduced by each of the adversaries, and no expense seems to be
too great to overcome the position of the opponent. Frequently, the
economic burden of annexation upon the annexing municipality is
devastating.1 s Consequently, a critical evaluation of annexation when
correlated to the existing governmental structure must lead to the
realization that the Commonwealth has found its Gordian knot.
B. Early Annexation Statutes
The earliest method employed in the Commonwealth to accomplish extension of boundaries of municipal corporations was by the
legislature. 1° Application to the General Assembly was made by the
2
municipality to amend its charter to incorporate the new boundary. 0
The General Assembly would grant the charter amendment by special
act subject to approval by the electors of the area affected. 21 In the
event the proposed extension was deemed inappropriate, the legislature
declined to entertain action on the amendment. The above outlined
method of annexation was consistently employed within the Commonwealth until the adoption of the Constitution of 1902.22 From July io,
19o2, until March io, 1904, Virginia was without a general annexation
statute,23 and a legal moratorium on annexation existed during this
"Note ii, supra.

'XAnnexation has been a judicial function since March 1o, 1904. See VA. Aers
ASSEMBLY 1904, ch. 99 at 144-48.

OF

IsSee record in City of Richmond v. Henrico County (1965). Richmond refused to
accept annexation at a cost of approximately $59,000,000. See also record in City of
Bristol v. Washington County (1965). Neither case was appealed.
21See Report of the Proceedings and Debates of the Constitutional Convention
of 1901-1902 (19o6)-Committee Report regarding Article VIII, Section 126.
"For an example of process prior to VA. CONST. (1902) see, Arey v. Linsey, 1o3
Va. 250, 48 S.E. 889 (19o4).
"Ibid.
22VA. CONST. art. 8, § 126 prohibits annexation by special act.
zrThe general annexation statute was adopted by the General Assembly March lo,
1904. VA. AcTs 19o4, ch. 99 at 144-48.
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period. 24 However, on March io, 1904, the General Assembly passed
an act,25 thereafter designated Code of 1904, title 16, chapter 44, sec26
tion lo4a.
With the adoption of Code of 1904, section 1o14a, annexation
by municipalities became a judicial function. 27 While subsequent enactments on the subject have made changes in the composition of
the court 28 and the authority by whom the court is constituted,2 9 the
actual proceedings are still basically judicial in character. 30 Lest confusion arise over the descriptive terminology, "basically" we hasten
to explain that the current statute as well as past statutes impose
upon the trial court some responsibilities which are legislative in
character. 31 Moreover, the writers do not criticize this procedure for
to understand existing annexation practice is to realize that annexation cannot be singularly judicial in nature.
In Henrico County v. Richmond,32 the first case to reach the Court
of Appeals after the passage of the act, section l14a, was found to
be a constitutional and valid exercise of judicial authority.33 Since
the ruling in the Henrico County case, there have been several other
constitutional attacks on the authority of the courts to hear and
determine annexation proceedings, but the Court of Appeals has
rejected every attack.3 4
In 1914, the General Assembly authorized a re-codification of the
statute law of the Commonwealth. 35 Pursuant to this authority, the
2Annexation proceedings could not be commenced after July 1o, 1902 until
legislation provided the machinery.

-Note 23, supra.
2Code 1904 is not an official codification but is merely prima fade evidence of
statutes contained therein. See, VA. CODE. Preface (1919).
2rVA. CODE. § 1014a (19o4).
'OVA. Acrs, 1924, ch. 44 at 664 provides for a three-judge court.
2VA. Acrs, 1940, oh. 37 at 43 designates the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court
of Appeals or a committee of Justices designated by him to appoint the court instead of the Governor.
IWA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-1038 (Repl. Vol. 1964) still provides for a court to hear

the case.
31See, Henrico County v. Richmond, io6 Va. 282, 55 S.E. 683 (1906). Reading
the current statute shows the court's analysis there to be equally true today.
"io6 Va. 282, 55 .E. 683 (19o6).
"Ibid. One should note, however, the dissent in 106 Va. at 3o0, 55 S.E. at 69o.
It seems that many of the governmental entities of the state were in a great furor
over the matters finally put to rest by this decision.
"Falls Church v. County Board, 166 Va. 192, 184 S.E. 459 (1936); Norfolk County
v. Portsmouth, 124 Va. 639, 98 S.E. 755 (1919); Warwick County v. Newport News, 12o
Va. 177, go S.E. 644 (1916); Alexandria v. Alexandria County, L17 Va. 230, 84 S.E. 630
(1915) and Henrico County v. Richmond, io6 Va. 282, 55 S.E. 683 (19o6).
"VA. Aars, 1914, ch. 193 at 3oo; VA, AcTS, 1915, ch. i8 at 40.
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Code of 1919, the first official codification since 1849,36 was adopted
and became the statutory law of Virginia.3 7 Code of 1919, title 26,
chapter 120, sections 2956 thru 2968, the annexation provisions of
the new Code, were substantially the same as Code of 1904, title 16,
chapter 44, section lo4a. From 1919 through the official re-codification of 1950, the annexation statutes of Virginia remained substantially unchanged with, however, several noteworthy exceptions.38
In 1952, following an exhaustive report made by a special study
commission, 39 the General Assembly repealed the existing annexation
law and adopted in lieu thereof Code of 1950, sections 15-152.2 thru
15-152.28.40 Chapter 623, Acts of Assembly 1962, effective July 1, 1964,

repealed Code of 195o, title 15 and enacted in lieu thereof title 15.1.
As a result of the enactment of title 15., new section numbers were
assigned to the annexation statute, but no significant changes were
made in the substantive provisions of the law. 41 There is one further
interesting act which the General Assembly of 1962 adopted in relation to annexation. Chapter 625, Acts of Assembly of 1962, declared
a legal moratorium on new annexation proceedings from June 29,
1962, until the expiration of ninety days following the adjournment
of the regular session of the General Assembly of Virginia of 1964.42
In very general terms, a comparative analysis of the current annexation law with the prior repealed enactments reflects the legislative
intention of granting to the annexation courts more discretion in
reaching their decisions. 43 One can, also see a broadened recognition
of the diverse interests involved in annexation proceedings. 44 Finally,
it is apparent that the legislature has begun to appreciate the enormous
financial burdens often imposed upon all parties in annexation
45
proceedings.
-VA. CODE,

Preface (1919).

"TVA. Ams OF ASSEMBLY 1918, ch. io8 at 211.
MNotes 8o, 3t, supra; see also, VA. Aars, 1928,

ch. 412 at 1076, which revised the
statute to require necessity and expediency rather than necessity or expediency.
10Report, Commission to Study Urban Growth, Doc. No. 13 (1951).
'VA. Acrs, 1952, ch. 323 at 627.
"See VA. Acrs, 1954, ch. 3 at 3; VA. Acms, 1958, ch. 378 at 497; VA. ACms, 1960,
ch. 474 at 731; VA. Acrs, ig6o, ch. 519 at 827 and VA. Acrs, 196o, ch. 550 at 855. With
these amendments the repealed statute was almost identical to the new annexation
statute.
"See, VA. CODE ANN. § 15-152.29 (195O) for the text of the act which is now
repealed.
"Compare VA. CODE ANN. §§ 15.1-1037, 15.1-1040, 15.1-1042, 15.1-1046 (Repl.
Vol. 1964) with prior statutes.
"Compare VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-1036 (Repl. Vol. 1964) with prior statutes.
"5Compare VA. CODE ANN. §§ 15.1-1070, 15.1-1046, 15.1-1055 (Repl. Vol. 1964) with

prior statutes.
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II. ANNEXATION TODAY-PROBLEM AREAS
(A) Institution of Proceedings
W'hile it may appear from the brief treatment of the historical
background of annexation that important developmental and evolutionary materials have been minimized, such is not the case. The
current statute contains certain problem areas which deserve analysis
in light of present day circumstances. However, analysis of these
problem areas in current practice frequently must allude to the past,
particularly in the field of judicial decisions.
This analysis will commence with the difficulties relating to the
institution of annexation proceedings, and develop in reasonably
strict accordance with statutory sequence. Code of 1950, section 15.11032, in obedience to the Constitution,4 6 provides in essence that
municipal boundaries shall remain fixed unless changed in the
manner provided in the subsequent sections. The two Code sections
47
following, define who may institute a proceeding.
48
Ordinance annexation actions may be instituted by either a
city or a town. Close attention should be given to the provisions of
this section and care should be taken by municipal governing bodies
to adopt proper ordinances. The Court of Appeals, apparently leaving the questions to be decided in each case,4 9 has repeatedly held
that an ordinance in substantial compliance with this section
is all that is required. 50 However, it has been held that the failure to
enact an ordinance substantially complying with the provisions of
section 15.1-1 33 will defeat the annexation court's jurisdiction.r1
Moreover, the Court of Appeals, recognizing the adoption of an
ordinance by a municipal governing body as a legislative act, has
held that changes in annexation ordinances cannot be effected by
2
the judiciary.
At the risk of destroying continuity, it is felt that it is proper to
"VA. CONST. art. 8, § 126.
§§ 151-103, 15.1-1034 (Repl. Vol. 1964).
'VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-1033 (Repl. Vol. 1964).
"See, Warwick County v. Newport News, 120 Va. 177, go S.E. 644 (1916);
Alexandria v. Alexandria County, 117 Va. 230, 84 S.E. 63o (1915) and Henrico County
v. Richmond, io6 Va. 282, 55 S.E. 683 (19o6), for substantial compliance. See Martinsville v. Henry County, 204 Va. 757, 133 S.E.2d 287 (1963), for an insufficient ordinance.
50Warwick County v. Newport News, 12o Va. 177, go S.E. 644 (1916); Alexandria
v. Alexandria County, 117 Va. 230, 84 S.E. 630 ('95) and Henrico County v. Richmond, io6 Va. 282, 55 S.E. 683 (igo6).
"Martinsville v. Henry County, 204 Va. 757, 133 S.E.2d 287 (1963).
w'bid.
.'VA. CODE ANN.
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correlate consideration of section 15.1-1046 into the discussion at this
point. It provides:
"No proceedings brought under this chapter shall fail because
of a defect, imperfection or omission in the pleadings which
does not affect the substantial rights of the parties or any other
technical or procedural defect, imperfection or error, but the
court shall at any time allow amendment of the pleadings
or make any other order necessary to insure the hearing of
the case on its merits."
Lest the novitiate be lulled into a false sense of security, take heed
that the import of section 15.1-1046 is not all encompassing. Comparison of the cases of Portsmouth v. Norfolk County, 3 and Martinsville v. Henry County,54 gives one insight into the amendatory
authority of the annexation court. In the Portsmouth case the municipality substantially complied with section 15-152.3. 55 However, the
map published in the newspaper pursuant to section 15-152.5 was
illegible. Norfolk County moved to dismiss the proceedings on this
ground and on the ground that the city had failed to make a formal
motion to grant the annexation on the return day of the petition.
The annexation court sustained the motion, and the Court of Appeals
reversed. The Court of Appeals in deciding the publication question
held,
"[W]here there is a technical or procedural defect in the notice,
pleadings or trial, under Code, § 15-152.16, [Now § 15.1-1046]
the trial court should in its ruling, before dismissing the case,
give the party in default an opportunity to amend or correct
the imperfection. In the instant case the trial court did not
indicate the ground or grounds on which it based its final order
and it does not appear that the court pointed out to the City
any defect in the proceeding. Consequently, in light of the
liberal provisions of Code, § 15-152.16, and because no substantial rights of the parties were or could be affected by the
defective publication nor by its proper republication, we hold
that this defect, without giving the City an opportunity to
republish the notice and ordinance, was not alone a sufficient
ground for dismissing this annexation proceeding."' 0
In regard to the failure of the City to make a formal motion
to grant the annexation on the return day the Supreme Court ruled,
"[I]n its petition the City made a motion to annex the pro"ig8 Va. 247, 92 S.E.2d 296 (1956).
r"204 Va. 757, 133 S.E.2d 287 (1963).
W198 Va. at 247, 92 SXE.2d at 3oo.
rMId. at 252-53, 92 S.E.2d at 3o.
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posed territory and only failed to make a similar motion on
the date stated in the notice. This failure on the part of the
City has in no way affected the substantial rights of the County
and is at most, if at all, only a technical defect and an insufficient reason for dismissing the case. Code, § 15-152.16."57
We are, however, given a glimpse of the other side of the coin
in the Martinsville case.58 The City adopted an annexation ordinance
and attached to the ordinance a map as permitted by section 15-152.3. 59
[now 15.1-1033.] The map provided by the City and published as
required failed to show existing uses of the area to be annexed. Henry
County demurred to the motion on the ground that the requirements
of section 15-152.3 had not been met, and the trial court sustained
the demurrer because the map did not provide the requisite information. The trial court in its order granted the City leave to correct the
deficiency within thirty days by filing an amended map. The County,
after the new map was filed, filed a plea to the jurisdiction alleging
that the original map did not comply with section 15-152.3 and that
the new map had neither been adopted by the City Council nor
served and published as required by section 15-152.5. The City offered
no evidence that its council had adopted an amendatory resolution.
The trial court by a divided vote sustained the County's plea and
dismissed the proceeding. The reason assigned for such action was
that the map, in lieu of a statement in the ordinance, failed to show
existing land uses as required, and the court was without authority
to permit the revised or amended map to be filed as the court would
in effect be amending the ordinance. The City appealed and the
Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's ruling. The Court of
Appeals in rejecting the City's contention that section 15-152.16
[now 15.1-1046] was applicable to the case ruled;
"We agree with the position of the County that the enactment
of an ordinance substantially complying with § 15-152.3 [Now
§ 15.1-1033] is jurisdictional. The adoption of such an ordinance
is the first and prequisite step in the proceeding.... [T]he
sufficiency of such an ordinance is a 'jurisdictional question.'...
The enactment of the required ordinance is a legislative
act.... Consequently, if a change in a legislative enactment is
necessary or desirable, it must be effected by the legislative
branch of the government and not by the judiciary ....[N]o
such legislative action has been shown in the present case.
7

6 1d. at 254, 92 S.E.2d at 302.
'OMartinsville v. Henry County, 204 Va. 757, 133 S.E.2d 287 (1963).
5Id. at 758, 133 S.E.2d at 287.
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It follows that the lower court was without authority to direct
or permit the amendment of the ordinance by incorporating
therein the new map."' 6 0
In specific relation to the theory advanced by the City, the Court
said,
"But in the present case the defect is not a procedural defect
in the notice, pleadings, or trial. It is a defect in the annexation ordinance itself, that is, in the legislative act of the city
council. Clearly, then, § 15-152.16 has no application here." 61
Although one is not confronted with any particular difficulty in
reconciling the rulings in the two preceding cases, certain interesting
questions remain unresolved. Clearly an illegible publication may be
corrected, but is the situation altered by either a failure to publish in
toto or by failure to publish the required number of times? This
question was not raised in the Portsmouth cases; however it was raised
in the Martinsville case in the trial court. 62 The trial court-sustaining
the jurisdictional plea on a more basic ground-apparently saw no
necessity to rule on the publication question. The question was, of
course, not raised in the Court of Appeals. However, a more basic
question arises from the Martinsville ruling. Would the ruling have
been different had the city introduced an amendatory resolution of
its council authorizing the use of the corrected map? Proffered answers
to these questions would be purely speculative; moreover, these questions, while interesting, do not cry out for answers. Consequently, it
is suggested that counsel for annexing municipalities closely scrutinize
the proceeding at every step to insure in the first instance that statutory
requirements, especially the substantive ones, are met.63 The final consideration regarding section 15.1-1o3 proceedings concerns subparagraph (C).6 4 Unquestionably, compliance with this subsection is as
jurisdictional as is compliance with any other part of section 15.1-1033,
but an equally important consideration relating to subsection (c) is
in an entirely different direction. Responsible treatment of subsection
(c) requirements by annexing municipalities can go a long way in
promoting a favorable determination of the proceeding. In spite of
the innate hostilities generally attendant upon independent munici'Id. at 761, 133 S.E.2d at 289-9o.
61d. at 761-62, x33 S.E.2d at 290.
621d. at 759, 133 S.E.2d at 288.
rThe ruling in Martinsville v. Henry County makes it clear that substantive
defects cannot be cured by amendment.
64VA. CODE ANN. § 15-1033(c) (195o) required the terms and conditions upon
which annexation is sought to be set out in the ordinance.
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palities' proceedings, a reasonable and responsible attitude will frequently breed an analogous response from the opposing governing
body. Moreover, any necessary appellate proceedings will likely be
more effective should the trial court reject reasonable terms offered by
a city. Of similar import is the fact that a municipality is in a substantially more advantageous position to decide whether or not it
should accept annexation upon altered terms,0 5 if it has made responsible computations in advance. As a point of clarity, towns are not as
much concerned with terms and conditions of annexation as are
cities by reason of cities' independent status.
Code of 1950, section 15.1-1034, the other definitive statute heretofore mentioned, is referred to as the petition annexation statute.
It provides that 51 per cent of the qualified voters of territory adjacent
to a city or town, the governing body of the county in which such
territory is located or the governing body of a town comprising such
territory may institute a proceeding. 66 While this section or a similar
67
one has been embodied in our annexation law since its inception,
only three cases of this type have been ruled upon by the Court
of Appeals. 68 The three cases, Nexsen v. Board,69 Mowry v. Virginia
Beach,7 0 and Chesterfield County v. Berberich,71 while principally
important to both species of annexation, are, nonetheless, significant
solely to petition annexations to some extent. In the Nexsen case
the petition area included an incorporated town. 72 In fact the unincorporated territory involved was adjacent to the town, not to Newport News. The county demurred on the ground that Code of igg,
section 2956 did not apply to annexation of an incorporated town
with other outlying territory to a city. The trial court sustained the
demurrer and dismissed the proceeding, but the Court of Appeals
granted a writ and reversed the trial court's ruling. Three questions
were argued in the appellate court. (i) the issue raised in the trial
65See generally, VA. CODE ANN. § i5.1-1o44 (Repl. Vol. 1964) which authorizes
cities and towns in ordinance annexations to decline annexation on terms and conditions other than those contained in the ordinance.
"VA CODE ANN. § 15.1-1034 (Repl. Vol. 1964).
7

" Compare VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-1034 (Repl. Vol. 1964) with VA. Acms, 19o4, ch.
99 at 144 and VA. ConE § 2856 (1910).

0ne should be cognizant of the fact that other cases of this type have been
tried and not appealed or appealed and a writ denied. E.g., Angle v. City of Roanoke,
Civil No. 124 (Cir. Ct. 1963); Davis v. City of Roanoke, Civil No. 18 (Cir. Ct. 1963).
See also Young v. Town of Salem, Civil No. 152 (Cir. Ct. 1966) now pending in the
Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia.
n1 9 8 Va. 205, 93 S.E.2d 323 (1956).
n 1 9 9 Va. 5oo, 1oo S.E.2d 781 (1957).
72142 Va. 313, 128 S.E. 57 (1925).
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(2) that Code of 1924, section 288 5 b relating to annulment of
certain court charters of towns impliedly partially repealed Code of
1919, section 2956 and 2957 and (3) the effect of the failure of a city
to adopt an ordinance before a qualified voters' petition for annexation is filed. It should be noted that only the last question relates
peculiarly to petition annexations; however, the other two questions
are quite significant to annexation proceedings generally. In disposing
of the first question the Court of Appeals held:

court,

"We conclude therefore that the section [2956] under which
the proceeding was instituted, confers upon the court the jurisdiction which the petition invokes-that is, to hear this case on
its merits.
That this has been the view of this court is perfectly apparent
from a consideration of the record in the case of County of
Henrico v. City of Richmond, io6 Va. 282, 55 S.E. 683, 117
Am. St. Rep.

1oo....

In that case this court affirmed an order

of annexation, and there is no intimation in the opinion that
there is any lack of jurisdiction to order such annexation under
that statute, notwithstanding the fact, that there, as here, the
outlying territory included an incorporated town
as well as
7 3
other territory in the county outside of the town."

The Court of Appeals likewise rejected the implied partial repeal
theory stating:
"We find no difficulty whatever in reconciling these several
statutes. The latter statutes [Code 1924, 2885b] refer altogether
to the annulment of certain court charters of towns, as distinguished from cities. The result of the annulment of such a
town charter is that the territory involved reverts to the county
in which the town is located; whereas the result of such a procedure as this is, if the prayer of the petition be granted, that
instead of reverting to the county, the territory become annexed
to the city. There is no inconsistency between the two statutes.
[Code 1919, § 2956, 2957 and Code 1924, § 2885b] They refer
to different methods
of procedure for the accomplishment of
74
different results."

In the third question argued on the appeal the Supreme Court
clarified an important distinction between ordinance annexations
and petition annexations when it ruled:
"Where the initiative is by the city or town, the ordinance
must precede the filing of the petition, but we find nothing
in the statute which would justify us in holding that such an
ordinance must be passed before the filing of the petition,
'3Id. at 319, 128 S.E.2d at 571.

741d. at 32o-21, 128 S.E.2d at 572.
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when the initiative is taken, as it is here, by 51 per cent of the
voters in the territory involved. To us it seems 75simply a question of the practical application of the statute."
Even though the Nexsen case was decided under a subsequently
repealed annexation statute, the principles announced in the case
would seem to be as cogent to present practice as to past practice. The
methods of proceeding for annexation are the same in both the re76
pealed statute and the current statute.
The Mowiy case actually announces rulings which are better discussed in relation to Code provisions to be dealt with elsewhere in
this article. Consequently, comment on the case will be reserved for
a more appropriate place.
The Berberich77 case announces two principles which are closely
related. However, when these principles are catalogued, it is apparent
that only one applies solely to petition annexations. The facts in the
case establish that the qualified voters of the 239 acres petitioned to
be annexed were two in number. It further appears that the petition
area was substantially undeveloped and rural in character, and that
the owners of the acreage, apparently not qualified voters of the area
to be annexed, joined in the request for annexation. The trial court
after a hearing on the merits decreed the annexation as requested. The
County appealed and the Supreme Court affirmed, quoting with
approval the comment of the trial court as follows:
" 'It could scarcely be argued that a city could not petition
to annex an area simply because it comprised only one parcel
with only two inhabitants, and we see no just reason why the
petition should not be filed by the two inhabitants. The real
question is whether annexation is desirable and expedient.
Secs. 15-152.3 and 152.4 simply tell us who is to institute the
proceeding. In our opinion, the fact that the area is now
barren of urban development does not of itself, prohibit the
annexation ....[T]he farm lands immediately adjoining city
limits peculiarly adaptable for urban development should
not be regarded strictly as rural, especially where it is reasonably anticipated that urban development is imminent.' ,7
What is not actually said in the case is also of importance to petition annexations. It is quite clear that section 15.1-1034 petitioners
1Id. at p21-22, 128 S.E.2d at 572.
"OCompare VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-1O34 (Repl. Vol. 1964) with VA. CODE § 2956
(1919).
"199 Va. 500, loo S.E.2d 781 (1957).

"Id.

at 504, 100 S.E.2d at 784.
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need only the statutory interest79 in the subject matter of the litigation to institute the proceeding.
An additional problem inherent in petition proceedings relates to
the definition of the territory to be annexed. However, discussion of
this question is directly related to section 15.1-1042 and will be dealt
with there. The only other feature of section 15.1-1o34 actions which

requires comment is the statutory directive that the action once instituted shall proceed in all respects as if commenced as a section 15.11033 action unless otherwise provided by the act.so Reference is made
to this aspect of section 15.1-1034 for the sole purpose of calling

attention to it to demonstrate the importance of looking at the entire
statute discerningly. It should also be noted that mention is not made
of county or town proceedings under this section as there are no
reported cases on the subject.
Code of 1950, section 15.1-1035 provides for service, publication and

docketing, and dose attention to its provisions should eliminate any
difficulties in this area. The most important question raised in regard
to this section was raised in Portsmouth v. Norfolk County where
the Court of Appeals clarified the effect of the required publication
when it said,
"The publication required by Code, § 15-152.5 [Now 15.1-1035]

is not process but is designed to give notice to the public of
the proposed annexation and to supply those who may be
affected thereby, or interested therein, with certain information from which they may determine whether or not to act in
support of or against the proposed annexation. But the individual members of the public are not necessary parties to the
annexation proceeding ....Hence, the publication required by
Code, § 15-152.5 is not, as contended by the County a substitute
for personal service of process since no one is made a party by
this publication." 8'
Without suggesting that the foregoing comments cover the field,
it is felt that many of the pitfalls inherent in instituting annexation
proceedings have been pointed out. Moreover, the real substance of
,VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-1034 (Repl. Vol. 1964) requires that petitioners be qualified
voters only. This raises the question whether the rights of freeholders or property
owners in the area sought to be annexed are jeopardized. Certainly their rights
may be protected by intervention in the proceeding, but should they not have a
voice solely as property owners as to whether or not such an action is ever instituted.
n*VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-1037(b) (Repl. Vol. 1964). Apparently petitioners in two
counties could not institute one proceeding. See also, VA. CODE ANN. §§ 15.1-1044
& 15.1-1055 (Rep1. Vol. 1964).
8198 Va. 247, 251, 93 S.E.2d 296, 3oo-oi (1956).
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annexation is in the 'difficulties and questions raised in the trial. Quite
naturally, however, certain pre-trial matters must be explored first.
B. PRE-TRIAL CONSIDERATIONS
The writers are of the opinion that the statutory sequence of
directives are somewhat disarranged from this point to the conclusion
of the statute. Therefore, we will deal with all pre-trial matters in
this portion of the article.
Code of 195o, section 15.1-1034 provides the manner in which the

annexation court shall be constituted.8 2 The statute appears relatively
unequivocable in its terms and should not give rise to difficulties.
Nonetheless, attention is directed to Norfolk v. Oast,8 3 where the
Court of Appeals held that the annexation court as defined by repealed Code of 1950, section 15-133 could not be constituted on the

facts of the case and sustained dismissal of the proceeding. 84 The
present Code provisions,8 5 however, seem to obviate the result of the
Oast case. The most serious problem presented by section 15.1-1038

seems to be one of when the court should be constituted. Although
this precise question has never reached the Court of Appeals, the
Court has said, in a somewhat anticipatory declaration:
"Except as otherwise stated in Code, § 15-152.8, [Now § 15.11o38] the annexation court is comprised of three judges, two of
whom are required to be judges of circuit courts remote from
the territory sought to be annexed. These judges are not
designated until after the notice has been filed, and in most
of the cases the days on which the court will convene must be
left to the convenience and discretion of its members. It is
apparent therefore that at the time of filing its notice of annexation, the city or town cannot be certain that the annexation
8
2Comprised of three judges-judge of circuit court of county involved and
two circuit judges of circuits remote from area-designated by Chief Justice or
committee of Justices designated by him.
83189 Va. 501, 53 S.E.2d 137 (1949).
88
The former statute, VA. CODE ANN. § 15-133 (1950) provided for the court to be
comprised of judge of circuit court of county involved, the judge of the circuit
court of the city seeking to annex and a judge of a remote circuit. Norfolk sought
to annex territory in Norfolk County and Princess Anne County by one ordinance.
A proceeding was instituted in Circuit Court of Norfolk County pursuant to VA.
CODE ANN. § 15-130 (1950). The circuit judges of Princess Anne and Norfolk counties were not the same person. Judge Oast of Norfolk County dismissed the proceeding on the ground that a court could not be constituted and the Court of
Appeals denied a writ of prohibition. But see dissent by Chief Justice Hudgins
and Justice Eggleston, Norfolk v. Oast, 189 Va. 5ol, 53 S.E.d 137 (1949).

"'See

amendment to VA. CODE ANN. § 15-152.8 (1950) by VA. Acrs OF AssEMBLY

1954, ch. 3 at 3 which was carried over into
1964).

VA.

CODE ANN. § 15.1-1038 (Repl. Vol.
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court will be in session on any 'given day.' Furthermore, there
is no compelling reason for requiring the motion to annex to
be made before the local judge on a 'given day' since the case
is on the docket and must await the convening of the annexation court."so
From the foregoing declaration, it seems apparent that the Court
of Appeals has determined that the annexation court should be
designated after the notice is filed but before the return day of the
notice. Nevertheless, in some recent cases the circuit court in which
the proceeding was instituted has undertaken to determine jurisdic87
tion before requesting the designation of an annexation court. Consequently, a situation is found in which a circuit court is undertaking
to perform a legitimate function of the annexation court. That is
to say, the import of the statute and the thrust of the ruling of the
Court of Appeals s s effectively establishes that the circuit court is
ousted of all jurisdiction89 once the notice is filed and the case is
docketed. 00
We now turn to a consideration of several other pre-trial matters.
Code 1950 section 15.1-1636 provides who may come into the action
once instituted. While not explicitly provided, presumptively such
additional parties may offer evidence either in favor or against the
proposed annexation. 91 The leading case on this section is Continental
Baking Co. v. Charlottesville,92 where the Court of Appeals determined that a proper construction of the statute obviated the necessity of additional parties having a special interest or being affected
in a special way. In view of this ruling one must conclude that almost
anyone could become a party to an annexation proceeding. However,
the weight and sufficiency attached to evidence introduced by a party
88

Portsmouth v. Norfolk County, 198 Va. 247, 253, 93 S.E.2d 296, 302 (1956).
8See records in Weddle v. City of Roanoke, Civil No. 98 (Cir. Ct. 1966) and
Kinsey v. City of Roanoke, Civil No. 126 (Cir. Ct. 1966) both pending in the Circuit
Court of Roanoke County.
I Portsmouth v. Norfolk County, 198 Va. 247, 97 S.E.2d 296 (1956).
'OIt appears that the circuit court as a circuit court is without jurisdiction to
hear annexation matters-the annexation court is a statutory court specifically designated to hear annexation proceedings and even where only the local judge hears
an annexation case his jurisdiction and authority are determined by statute.
Continental Baking Co. v. Charlottesville, 202 Va. 798, 120 S.E.2d 476 (1961); Portsmouth v. Norfolk County, 198 Va. 247, 93 S.E.2d 296 (1956) and Henrico County
v. Richmond, io6 Va. 282, 55 S.E. 683 (19o6).
"See VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-1035 (Repl. Vol. 1964) for docketing requirements.
"The nature of the evidence which can be introduced could be decided in
Young v. Town of Salem, Civil No. 152 (Civ. Ct. 1966) which is now pending in the
Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia.
g22o2 Va. 789, 120 S.E.2d 476, 479.
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remotely affected by or interested in the proceeding would not be
too great unless such evidence was extremely cogent. Herein, then,
lies the safeguard.
Code of

195o,

section 15.1-1037(a) provides for consolidation of

proceedings seeking to have the same or part of the same territory
annexed to different municipalities. The provisions of this section
seem clear and unequivocable. However, there is now pending in the
Court of Appeals a case in which the trial court failed to comply with
the statute where the circumstances envisioned by the statute clearly
existed. 93 This Code provision bears a direct relation to section 15.11042 and an analysis of the correlated problems will be made in the
discussion of section

15.1-1042.

Section

1S.1-10 3 7(b) provides the

method by which a city or town may institute one proceeding against
two or more counties. However, this Code provision is not mandatory
as a city or town may institute one proceeding against two counties
in the circuit court of the county where the larger part of the territory is located, or the city or town may institute separate actions
94
against each of the several counties.
To consider sections 15.1-1055 and 15.1-1057 in a discussion of

pre-trial matters may at first glance appear unusual. However, if one
views these two sections as jurisdictional defenses, it is appropriate to
consider them here. Section

15.1-1057,

prohibits annexation of a

part of a town. Although there is no case which has construed this
section, we must assume that an ordinance which included only a
portion of a town in the metes and bounds description would be
fatally defective.9 5 Moreover, a careful reading of the statute would
indicate that the same defense would be available in a petitioners'
action. 96
We now turn to the somewhat more involved jurisdictional defense provided by Code of 195o, section 15.1-1o55. Unquestionably, the
"See Young v. Town of Salem, Civil No. 152 (Cir. Ct. 1966) which is now
pending in the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia. A problem does arise, however, in the case where the overlapping petition is filed after the trial in the pending
suit has commenced and particularly where the trial is concluded but a final order
has not been entered. Technically at least it would seem that the first case would
still be pending.
"King v. Hening, 203 Va. 582, 125 S.E.2d 827 (1962).
'-Martinsville v. Henry County, 20o4 Va. 757, 133 S.E.2d 287 (1963), indicates such
result because the metes and bounds description dictated by the Code would not
be adequate; and, moreover, proper terms and conditions could not be set out in
the ordinance as required.
"OIf only part of town were included in the petition it would be practically
impossible to determine whether or not the required 51% had authorized a petition
to be filed.
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proper place to raise the defense, if it is available, is at the outset of
the proceedings. However, the real problem is the exact nature of
the defense. The meat of the statute is provided by the first three
sentences which read,
"No city or town, having instituted proceedings to annex territory of a county, shall again seek to annex territory of such
county within the five years next succeeding the entry of the
final order in any annexation proceedings under this article or
previous acts except by mutual agreement of the governing
bodies affected, in which case the city or town moving to dismiss the proceedings before a hearing on its merits may file a
new petition five years after the filing of the petition of the prior
suit. Nor shall any county be made defendant in any annexation proceeding brought by any city, except by consent of the
county governing body, more frequently than once in any fiveyear period following the conclusion of any annexation proceeding instituted against it by any city; provided, however,
that this provision shall not apply to any suits brought by
consent of the county governing body; nor shall this provision
apply to any annexation proceedings pending and undetermined
on June twenty-seventh, nineteen hundred and fifty-eight.
Notwithstanding the foregoing provisions, a city shall have
the right to file and maintain an annexation proceeding against
any county against which it has not filed such a proceeding
during the preceding eight years....-97

One can be certain of only two things in regard to this statute.
First the prohibitions of the statute are not applicable to petition
annexation, i.e., qualified voter petitions.98 An secondly, the third
sentence of the statute qualifies both the first and second sentences. 99
The single most important question in relation to 'the statute is one
of reconcilation. Query: what is the specific significance of the first
and second sentences of section 15.1-1055? In the first sentence we
find a prohibition against a city or town instituting proceedings
against a county within five years of the entry of a final order in a
proceeding by said city or town against the same county. However,
where a city or town moves to dismiss a proceeding before trial, the
five year limitation is computed from the date the dismissed proceeding was filed. This provision seems clear enough. It simply relieves a county of the burden of defending in rapid succession numerous actions filed by the same municipality.
The second sentence of section 15.1-1o55 prohibits any city from
7VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-1055 (Repl. Vol. 1964).

'Mowry v. Virginia Beach, 198 Va. 205, 93 S.E.2d 323 (1956).
MPortsmouth v. Chesapeake, 205 Va. 259, 156 S.E.2d 817 (1964).
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making any county a defendant in any annexation proceeding more
frequently than once in any five-year period following the conclusion
of any annexation proceeding instituted by any city. This prohibition is not so clear as the first, and so far as is known the two
prohibitions have never been construed in relation to each other.
It should be noted that the second prohibition relates only to cities.
100
This fact, when viewed in light of the governmental status of cities,
makes a reconciliation of the separate statutory limitations somewhat
less difficult. Since both limitations are to alleviate the burdensomeness of annexations upon counties, 10 one can only conclude that the
legislature recognized that the first limitation alone was not sufficient
to alleviate the burden upon counties subject to annexation by more
than one city. Hence, the apparent import of section 15.1-1055 is

to limit to one the number of city annexations a county will have
to defend in any five-year period subject to the maximum limitation
of eight years. A more important problem in the application of this
section is the point from which the five years are computed. The
first limitation provides for computation from the entry of the
final order. What is the final order is not so clear. Unquestionably
the annexation court's order which is not appealed from is a final
order, but this is not necessarily the case where an appeal is taken.
It seems reasonably clear that when a writ of error is denied by the
Court of Appeals the limitation is computed from the entry of the
order of the trial court. Moreover, the statute' 0 2 seems to make it
clear that the period shall be computed from the entry of an order
of the Court of Appeals affirming an order granting annexation.
Likewise, if the Court of Appeals reverses or modifies the judgment
of the trial court, the Court of Appeals must enter such order as the
trial court should have entered and such order is final. 03 However,
the situation becomes muddled where a writ is granted to an order
denying annexation and the Court of Appeals affirms such order.
A genuine difference of opinion exists between qualified annexation
lawyers as to when the five-year period begins to run in this situation.
The Attorney General has issued an opinion, 04 but this of course
has not ended the debate. The better part of discretion would doubt1'See note i supra.
10
Mowry v. Virginia Beach, 198 Va. 20 5 , 93 S.E.2d 323 (1956).
102VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-1047 (Repl. Vol. 1964).
'I'VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-1o5o (Repl. Vol. 1964).
2°'See [1964-1965] VA. Arr'y GEN. OPS. AND REP. TO THE Gov. 5, wherein it is
said the period should be computed from date of entry of order of the Court of
Appeals.
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less indicate caution on the part of annexation conscious municipalities. However, one is constrained to ask would an action dismissed
because it had no jurisdictional foundation have been an action
ab initio? If "final order" gives rise to debate, what then of the term
"conclusion"?
Two other Code sections should be noted before leaving the
discussion of pre-trial matters. The first is section 15.1-1039 which
establishes the method of filling vacancies on the annexation court.
This provision is equally applicable to all stages of the proceedings,
and mention is made of it here merely as a matter of convenience.
Finally, section 15.1-1040, in an obvious effort to curtail economic
burdens incident to annexation proceedings, directs that a pre-trial
conference be held. At least one such conference is mandatory. Moreover, as a practical matter annexation courts convene as many conferences as are reasonably necessary in order to carry out the purpose
of the statute.10 5 Note, however, that agreement or stipulation to
all matters set out in the statute is not a prerequisite to a trial.
C. MATTERS INCIDENT TO TRIAL
The trial of an annexation proceeding is covered in the provisions
of just two Code provisions. 06 Code of 1950, section 15.1-1041 prescribes the criteria by which the annexation court is to determine
whether or not any given annexation is to be granted. Whereas, Code
of 195o, section 15.1-1042 prescribes the powers of the annexation
court to determine area and fix terms and conditions of the annexation to be granted. Of necessity, therefore, it is appropriate to examine
the more difficult aspects of section 15.1-1041 even though the more
difficult questions apparently arise out of section 15.1-1o42.107 The
real substance of section 15.1-1041 is provided by subparagraph (b)
which reads,
"The court shall determine the necessity for and expediency
of annexation, considering the best interest of the county and
the city or town, the best interests, services to be rendered and
"'See record in Roanoke v. Roanoke County, Civil No.
where numerous pre-trial conferences were held.

11o

(Cir. Ct. 1959),

"'See VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-1043 (Repl. Vol. 1964). Evidence on these matters
should be presented of course but this section is quite closely tied to VA. CODE
ANN. § 15.1-1042 (Repl. Vol. 1964) and probably is separated only as a matter of
convenience.
'This section is the price tag portion of the code and governmental entities
worry more about this aspect of the case than anything else.
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needs of the area proposed to be annexed, and the best interests of the remaining portion of the county ..."108
Before launching into a discussion of subparagraph (b), we point
out that the remaining parts of the section are a study in mechanics
and that subparagraph (e) is not applicable to petition annexations.
The court's first duty is to determine if the requested annexation is
necessary and expedient' 09 within the terms of the statute. The Court
of Appeals in Norfolk County v. Portsmouth, defined necessary and
expedient, possibly as well as the terms can be defined within the
context of the statute, when Mr. Justice Staples said:
"It is clear from the maps exhibited to us and from the testimony of many witnesses that, unless the future growth and
expansion of Portsmouth are to be almost completely obstructed, the annexation of both areas is necessary. The evidence
shows that both are already so closely interwoven into the
life, and the business and commericial activities of the city,
as to constitute an integral part thereof. The homes and industrial properties in these areas, the evidence shows, have
resulted from the city's natural growth and expansion. The
people who live and work there constitute an integral part
of what 0. Henry portrays as 'The Voice of the City.' To require them, nevertheless, to remain under separate and different types of governmental administration and control would
run afoul of the established policy of the State above alluded
to that urban areas should be under urban government and
rural areas under county government. Such a condition of
divided government is one compactly settled urban community
would be likely to generate undesirable frictions and controversies among the respective inhabitants.
Is the annexation 'expedient' within the meaning of the statute?
That is-as we interpret the word-is it advantageous and in
furtherance of the aforesaid policy of the State with respect
to annexation.""u 0
A more recent case of similiar import is Fairfax County v. Fairfax. 11 It appears, from what the Court of Appeals has said, axiomatic
'1vA. CODE ANN. §

15.1-1041 (Repl. Vol. 1964).
"'VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-1041 (Repl. Vol. 1964) clearly requires this finding

first. However, evidence in the cases is frequently hopelessly intermingled. E.g., see
records in Young v. Town of Salem, Civil No. 152 (Cir. Ct. 1966) and Davis v.
City of Roanoke, Civil No. 18 (Cir. Ct. 1966).
no186 Va. 1032, 1045-46, 45 S.E.2d 136, 142 (1947).
n"-ol Va. 362, 111 S.E.2d 428 (1959). One should note the similarity of the
ruling in this case and Norfolk County v. Portsmouth, 186 Va. 1032, 45 S.E.2d 136
(1936) as pointed in the text of this article, but also note that the Fairfax County
case waters down the effect and importance of the announced State policy considerations,
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that expediency follows necessity. However, both must be proven
to sustain an annexation decree.11 2 Further heed should be given to
the fact that the Norfolk County case was decided under a former
statute." 3 Nonetheless, the writers suggest that the definitions there
established are of substantial value today because of the similiarity
between terminology employed in the two statutes. 114 A further
problem associated with necessity and expediency arises in the area
of urban society as opposed to rural society. In Norfolk County the
Supreme Court formulated an all inclusive appearing guidepost to
assist courts in determining necessity and expediency. It was there
said:
"We also concur in the position taken by the city that the
Virginia Constitution and statutes, by providing the different
types of government for the counties and cities of the State,
have established 'the policy of placing urban areas under city
government and keeping rural areas under county government,.,,115

In view of the announced State policy, it would seem that annexation would be a relatively uncomplicated proceeding." 6 However,
the thrust of the realistic guidepost established by Norfolk County has
been eroded away." 7 In this respect attention is directed to Roanoke
v. County of Roanoke, wherein it was said:
"[U]rbanization is an important factor to be considered, but
not a conclusive factor.""s
Once again we have not attempted to cover the entire concept
of 'necessity and expediency' but have merely tried to point out the
problems facing both the court in deciding the question and the
parties in the presentation of evidence either pro or con.
Having once decided that any given annexation is necessary and
expedient, the court must then come to grips with the provisions of
Code of 1950, section 15.1-1042. As heretofore suggested, the more
difficult problems incident to annexation trials, from the parties'
points of view, arise in regard to this section. This is true because
section 15.1-1042 is the "price tag" or "damages" section of the Annexa2'2Falls Church v. Board, 193 Va. 112, 68 S.E.2d 96 (1951).
MVA. CODE ANN. § 2956 (1919) (as amended).
4

u Compare VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-1041 (Repl. Vol. 1964) with VA. CODE ANN.
(1919).

§ 2958

"-Norfolk County v. Portsmouth, 186 Va. 1032, 1044-45, 45 S.E.-d 136, 141 (1947).
mIt would only be necessary to determine if an area were urban or not and
whether or not the city was financially able to serve the area after annexation.
mNote .1, up7a.
m2s-04 Va. 157, 167, 129 S.E.-2d 711, 718 (1963).
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tion Statute." 9 It is equally true that one of the principal concerns
of the parties to annexation is inevitably bound to the cost factor;
and therefore, a great deal of significance and importance is attached
to "terms and conditions" of annexation. 120 Nevertheless, we do not
intend to devote any significant time or space to this subject for two
reasons. First, it is felt that this is principally an area of highly
technical data to be compiled by expert witnesses such as accountants
and engineers. And secondly, the terms and conditions of annexation
depend almost exclusively on the particular facts of any given case
and precedents are of little value. One word of caution however, the
annexation lawyer cannot go to trial without being forearmed with
this information.
Our primary concern in the discussion of section 15.1-1042 will
treat with subparagraph (a) and its relation to certain other provisions of the annexation statute. Subparagraph (a) of section 15.1-1042
provides that the annexation court shall have the power:
"To determine the metes and bounds of the territory to be
annexed, and may include a greater or smaller area than that
described in the ordinance or petition, the court shall so draw
the lines of annexation as to have a reasonably compact body
of land, and so that no land shall be taken into the city
which is not adapted to city improvements, or which the city
will not need in the reasonably near future for development,
unless necessarily embraced in such compact body of land; ...
,121
The quoted Code provision has been frequently construed by the
Court of Appeals. 2 2 However, we have been unable to find a construction of it in relation to a specific portion of Code of 1950, section
15.1-1034. At a recent pre-trial conference in a pending qualified
voters' case the county moved to dismiss the proceeding because the
petitioners did not know by metes and bounds the territory sought
to be annexed at the time they signed the master petition. 123 Undeniably the petition filed to institute the proceeding contained the
requisite description and a map. Moreover, evidence taken in the
case establishes that a general outline map of the territory involved
was shown or available to the petitioners at the time they signed the
'It

is by authority of VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-104.2 (Repl. Vol. 1964) that the

annexation court is authorized to determine terms and conditions of annexation,

i.e., the price the city must pay the county for taking territory.
""See, 41 VA. L. Rav. 1129.
m

' VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-1042(a) (Repl. Vol. 1964).
"See VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-1042 (Repl. Vol. 1964) (Annot.).

'See record in Weddle v. City of Roanoke, Civil No. 98 (Cir. Ct. 1966), now
pending in the Circuit Court of Roanoke County.
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master petition. The crux of the County's argument apparently is that
the petitioners cannot say the annexation is necessary and expedient
if they do not know the precise metes and bounds of the territory in
regard to which they will subsequently file an annexation petition.
In the first instance the statute itself requires only that a metes and
124
bounds description be part of the petition instituting the proceeding.
Moreover, necessity and expediency are unquestionably factual determinations to be made by the annexation court. 25 More significantly,
however, the annexation court is given express authority to shape the
boundaries of the territory as it deems necessary. The question is
when the court is to exercise this authority. After it determines necessity and expediency for annexation exists, the court is directed to fix
the metes and bounds of the territory to be annexed. Consequently,
one can only conclude that the inclusion of metes and bounds
descriptions in petitions is to aid the court in determining the
jurisdictional questions involved in annexations. 26 However, such
descriptions are binding on no one, least of all the court, and are not
even remotely involved in determining necessity and expediency.
The final comments in regard to section 15.1-1042(a) will be

directed to its clarifying effect upon section 15.1-1037 (a). The problem
arises in relation to consolidation of cases in which the separate areas
are not totally co-extensive. Query; can the annexation court decree
annexation of all the territory overlapping as well as non-overlapping
to one of the municipalities. The prior analogous code section provided that the court must decree annexation to one or the other of the
municipalities. 127 However, the present code section merely provides
that the court shall enter such order as is just considering the interests
of all parties to each case. 1 28 While such wording would seem to permit

the court to decree that all the territory should be annexed to one
of the municipalities, the question has arisen. 129 However, when one
understands that the court possesses the power to enlarge or reduce
an area sought to be annexed, the answer appears with unexcelled
clarity.
An additional matter, which is probably more closely related to
2'-VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-1034 (Repl. Vol. 1964).

IZVA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-1042 (Repl. Vol. 1964).
LmVA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-1034 (Repl. Vol. 1964) requires 51% of the qualified
voters of the petition area and the percentage must relate to a specifically defined
area.

2See VA. CODE ANN. § 15-136 (1950) (repealed).
2-'VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-1037(a) (Repl. Vol. 1964).

LzYoung v. Town of Salem, Civil No. 152 (Cir. Ct. 1966) now pending in the
Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia.
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the trial than to any other area of the proceedings warrants some comment. Section 15.1-1o56 prohibits annexation in the event the county
would be reduced to an area of less than 6o squares miles, or be
otherwise left with insufficient area, population or sources of revenue
to support its government and schools unless the entire county is
ordered annexed. 3 0 In view of the alternative wording of the statute
one must presume that this section does not provide a county a
jurisdictional defense to either an ordinance or petition annexation.
Additional support is lent this conclusion in view of the annexation
court's power to alter the boundaries of the territory to be annexed. 31
The final matters incident to the trial of annexation proceedings
involves payment of costs. The statute is quite specific in this regard
and presents no particular problem. 132
D. POST-TRIAL CONSIDERATIONS
The first concern after the trial is concluded is the problem of
whether or not to accept the annexation upon the terms and conditions decreed. A municipality is given authority to decline the annexation by Code of 195o, section 15.1-1044 if it does so before the final
order is entered. However, this is a policy matter to be decided by the
governing body of the municipality, and we will not undertake to
elaborate upon much matters. We do, however, feel called upon to
point out that a municipality cannot decline to accept annexation if
the proceeding was initiated by petitioners. 13 3
The only really significant problem related to post-trial considerations arises in regard to Code of 1950, section 15.1-1o47. This section
provides that a court granting annexation shall continue to exist for
a period of five years from the effective date of any annexation order
entered. The extent of the power of the court thus continued in
existence gives rise to considerable speculation. This problem, however, has been alleviated for the most part by the ruling of the Court
of Appeals in City of Portsmouth v. City of Chesapeake.134 In that
case the Supreme Court was specifically called upon to define the
powers of such a court and there said,
"[I]ts functions are limited to the enforcement of the terms
and conditions of such annexation order as it may have en2'0VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-1056 (Repl. Vol. 1964).
131VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-1042 (Repl. Vol. 1964).
'eVA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-1045 (Repl. Vol. 1964).
1

3IMowry v. Virginia Beach, 198 Va. 205 , 93 S.E.2d 323 (1956). This is also clear

from the terms of VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-1044 (Repl. Vol. 1964).
' 2o5 Va. 259, 271, 136 S.E.2d 817 (1964).
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tered. There is nothing in the language of the statute to indicate that the court may be reconvened for the purpose of
reconsidering and rehearing its prior order denying to the
City of Portsmouth the right to annex any portion of the
territory sued for."' 35
Here as in the case of so many of the foregoing comments the
Court of Appeals was speaking of a former Code provision. 136 In
spite of this fact, the similarity of the statutes 3 7 justifies reliance on
the ruling.
The matter of an appeal must be considered at this time. In
this area, the attorney must evaluate the prior proceedings to determine the existence of error. This is, however, more a matter of
experience than a matter of any dogmatic guidelines which these
writers can set out. After the determination to appeal has been made,
the statute is reasonably explicit 3 8 and close attention to it is advised. As for appellate procedure, the Rules of Court' 39 provide the
guide. In the case of substantive law, the Court of Appeals has decided
that the same principles are applicable to annexation proceedings as
to any other appeals. 140 Further discussion of specific Code sections
will not be undertaken in this article. This is not to say that those
sections' 41 we have not discussed are not important. On the contrary,
they are important and should be consulted, but they are principally
mechanical in nature and should not give rise to problems.
III. REFLECTIONS ON ANNEXATION
It is presumed that most of the persons who have dealt with annexations would welcome the opportunity to offer suggested improvements
in the practice. We are no exception. However, it is only fair to point
out that all of the suggestions we may make are not original with
us. Of course, where the source of any idea is known appropriate
credit will be given. On the other hand, many ideas have evolved by
association of fragmentary pieces and no definite source is available.
131id. at 826.
mVA.

CODE ANN. § 15-152 (1950) (repealed).
'Compare VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-1047 (Repl. Vol. with VA. CODE ANN. §
15.152 (195o) (repealed).
2mVA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-1o49 (Repl. Vol. 1964).
'3VA. R. Cry. P. § 5:1 et seq.
l'WSee, York County v. Williamsburg, 204 Va. 732, 133 S.E.2d 520 (1963); Falls
Church v. Board, 193 A. 112, 68 S.E.2d 96 (ig5i); Narrows v. Giles County, 184
Va. 628, 35 S.E.2d 805 (1945); Henrico County v. Richmond, 177 Va. 754, 15 S.E.2d
309 (1941); Norfolk County v. Portsmouth, 124 Va. 639, 98 S.E. 755 (1919).
0
2' VA. CODE ANN. §§ 15.1-1048, 15.1-1051, 15.1-1052; 151-1053, 15.1-1054; 15.11o58 (Repl. Vol. 1964).
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Probably the single most important problem to be overcome in
reference to annexation in Virginia relates to the enormous economic
burdens created by annexation. We offer no solution to this problem,
Lot it seems that the only possible solution would be a major realignment of governmental units within the Commonwealth. In the face
of many years of tradition such a solution is a practical impossibility.
We do feel that a more realistic approach to the immediate problem
of the progression and preservation of an urban society can be
achieved. The fact that annexation by cities is a public necessity is
totally unarguable. 142 Moreover, the same is equally true of the
fact that county government, without major legislative overhauling,
is not equipped to meet the needs of an urban community. However,
within the basic framework of the current annexation statute a solution
is available. All that is required is a re-definition of the terms
necessity and expediency. Perhaps better phraseology would be a
return to the definition announced by Mr. Justice Staples. 143 That
is to say, urbanization of an area coupled with the financial ability of
the city to serve the area after annexation appears to be the only
realistic approach to annexation. The preservation of counties for
the mere sake of tradition defies reason. If county government is
incapable of meeting the needs of the people it should be abolished,
albeit county politicians will surely seek our heads.
It is the writers' feeling that improvement of the composition of
the annexation court could alleviate many of the problem areas of
annexation. A recommendation of the League of Virginia Counties
to the VALC Subcommittee Studying Annexation, Consolidation and
the Structure of Local Government in Virginia on March 1, 1967, is
quite good. As we understand its recommendation, the League advocates establishing a permanent annexation court consisting of a
panel of seven or nine judges. Three judges from this panel would
be designated to hear any given annexation case. The court would
also have a staff of independent experts as court employees to assist
the court in investigating and evaluating the mass of technical evidence incident to annexation proceedings. The principal drawback
to this suggestion is that it requires revision of the current statute
by legislative action of a major character. While we generally concur
with the above recommendation, we believe that less extensive revision of the current statute would accomplish an equally good
result. It is eminently fair and reasonable to have the judge of the
1 42
1

Norfolk County v. Portsmouth, 186 Va. 1o32, 45 S.E.2d 136 (1947).
3Id.
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circuit court of the county whose territory is sought to be annexed
on the court. The judge of such circuit court is closely associated
with many of the governmental functions of the county and is well
versed in the problems of county government both with relation to
annexation and otherwise. On the other side of the ledger, it seems
just as fair and reasonable that a judge of a court of record of the
city to which the territory is sought to be annexed should be a
member of the annexation court. Such a judge would be equally
cognizant of city problems as the county judge is of county problems.
The third judge sitting on the court should be a judge of any court
of record remote from the area in which the annexation case arises.
Thus, balance and temperance could be achieved within the framework of the current annexation statue. As the court is now constituted, cities particularly are frequently faced with the additional
problem of proving a case to a court that is not even remotely conversant with the problem of city government. How then can such a
court make a valid determination of necessity and expediency?
IV. CONCLUSION
In conclusion we wish only to say that it is hoped that this article
will be of some assistance to both the student and the practitioner
in recognizing and coming to grips with some of the problems associated with annexation in Virginia.
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